Chinese Submarine-launched missile splashes down in South Pacific

Hong Kong, July 14 : On 6 July, a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine launched a ballistic missile - of a type capable of carrying a nuclear warhead - deep into the South Pacific. The event startled nearby nations and confirmed the opaque nature of Chinese military activities.
The event was significant because it was the first time a People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine had ever launched a ballistic missile into open international waters on a flightpath approaching its full range. Indeed, this was China's first public demonstration of a submarine's ability to send a missile so far.
The flightpath of the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) saw it traveling over the northern Philippines and Luzon Strait. After passing nearby Palau and Guam and flying approximately 7,300km, the unarmed missile splashed down between Nauru and Tonga in the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone.
Senior Captain Wang Xuemeng, a PLAN spokesperson, said his country had "successfully launched a strategic missile carrying a dummy warhead toward relevant high seas of the Pacific Ocean at 12:01p.m., which landed precisely within the designated waters". China called it a "routine arrangement of the annual training of the PLA Navy".
China claimed its missile test complied with international law and practice because it notified countries in advance and it was "not directed at any specific country or target". However, China failed to measure up to its own claims, for it certainly did not meet the gold standard represented by the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, a voluntary code that entered into force in November 2002.
China has declined to ratify the Hague Code of Conduct, but in any case its notification to other countries occurred less than 24 hours before the missile test, whereas a day's notice is required. Furthermore, Beijing's notifications were given to selected countries bilaterally, rather than to all 140 Hague Code of Conduct members.
The code also requires parties to make mandatory pre-launch disclosures about the missile class, coordinates and azimuth, for example, whereas China gave only a very vague alert. Its alerts included notices to airmen (NOTAM) warning of possible missile launches on 6 July. This was either from the Bohai Sea (the innermost extension of the Yellow Sea) and following a flightpath over southern Japan, or a second launch heading generally eastward from the South China Sea.
Ultimately, the Chinese submarine fired the long-range SLBM from the latter location. As is typical of Chinese secrecy, the identity of the submarine platform was not given. However, it was likely a Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN), which forms the backbone of China's underwater nuclear-strike capability. The PLAN does possess a single Type 032 diesel-electric submarine that is sometimes used for SLBM tests, but on this occasion, China made the scenario as realistic as possible. This points towards use of a Type 094 SSBN.
Indeed, Decker Eveleth, an associate research analyst at the US-based CNA Corporation, is of the opinion that the issuance of two NOTAMs suggested China was simultaneously exercising forces in two submarine "bastions" - one in the South China Sea and the other in the Bohai Sea.
Eveleth described what he meant by submarine bastions. "China has a geographic problem with their nuclear submarines, as slipping a sub past the First Island Chain is hard [because] US/allied sub detection capabilities could pick it up and follow it. So China instead bases their submarines close to the Chinese coast where they are more protected. This generates some unfortunate problems related to testing at sea, as you can't really test from the Bohai without flying over Japan."
According to Eveleth, "I'd interpret the multiple NOTAMs and the confusion over trajectories as evidence China is exercising their sub-based nuclear deterrent command and control, combined with a flight test, to ensure the SLBMs are working."
The analyst elaborated, "Communicating with submarines is hard, as they are underwater (obviously). Timing communications windows is an operational problem that requires significant coordination. Doing it across multiple bastions across your entire nuclear command, control and communications infrastructure makes it even more complicated."
"Making sure simultaneous launch orders can be given to facilitate a nuclear second strike is vital and requires stress testing," he said. China would therefore want to rehearse this procedure and ensure its SLBMs are working as advertised. This may have been what it was doing during this 6 July drill. Eveleth added that the USA does this sort of testing all the time.
Tong Zhao, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, also noted the two NOTAMs "could indicate plans for two launches, or simply provide flexibility to ensure at least one launch despite uncertain weather or sea conditions. If the latter, it would reinforce the hypothesis that Beijing was determined to conduct the test on that specific date."
Another unknown factor is what type of missile the Chinese submarine fired. It was either a JL-2 or JL-3 SLBM. The latter was only unveiled at a September 2025 military parade in Beijing, so it is not as widely fielded as the JL-2. If it was the latter, then it was tested to nearly its full range. Conversely, the more-capable JL-3's range is an estimated intercontinental 10,000+km.
Of interest, Joseph Wu, Secretary-General of Taiwan's National Security Council, claimed it was a JL-2. On the other hand, some Chinese media speculated it was the newer JL-3 SLBM. Because the missiles look identical, imagery of the launch does not help identify the missile type.
This is not the first time China has hurled a ballistic missile deep into the Pacific Ocean either. On 25 September 2024, the PLA fired a land-based DF-31B intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from Hainan Island. Prior to that, China's previous such missile launch occurred back in 1980. With two tests in less than two years, it is possible China has upped the tempo of missile activities far from home.
Some commentators perceived significance in the date of the submarine missile test. It coincided with the start of the US-led RIMPAC 2026 naval exercise in Hawaii, plus it came a day before the anniversary of the outbreak of China's eight-year resistance against Japan on 7 July 1937.
It also happened to coincide with the start of an annual Chinese naval drill with Russia. Furthermore, the ink was barely dry on a new mutual defense treaty between Australia and Fiji signed that day.
The fact is, almost any date in the calendar could have some political significance to China. However, Eveleth declared it was "almost certainly not" a special signaling exercise by China for the benefit of other countries. He remarked: "I am immensely skeptical of this. We commonly over-index on 'signaling' as the reason China does anything, and ignore the reality that the PLA is a massive, lumbering bureaucracy."
He pointed out, "Not every single test is a signal, and these things have to be planned months, if not years in advance, especially when testing new tech. The PLAN has some program office somewhere and some officer marked this date out months ago. Subs have to be ready. Tracking ships have to be deployed. Other military offices have to be informed and wires uncrossed. Tech has to be checked and ready. It's not a thing you decide to do the weekend before."
Eveleth suggested China could have made it a signaling exercise if it wanted to. Beijing could have ramped up the rhetoric and the missile overflown a nation, for example. He said, "Instead, this is the new routine in the Pacific, and there's not really any reason to lose our cool about it."
Nonetheless, Zhao admitted, "The political messaging is open to multiple interpretations, which may well be the point." Beijing is never bashful about a little ambiguity to keep others guessing.
Mao Ning, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, said the test was "aimed at verifying the reliability, safety and effectiveness of relevant weapon systems". Zhao agreed. "This appears less likely to be a developmental test of a new SLBM than an operational demonstration using a relatively mature missile.
High-profile public demonstrations of strategic capabilities tend to prioritize reliability over novelty, as seen in China's 2024 full- range ICBM test. More sensitive SLBM tests have typically landed on Chinese territory or in nearby waters, rather than flying near advanced US missile tracking facilities in the Marshall Islands."
Of interest, the PLAN did not fire this missile over either Japan or South Korea. Importantly, Eveleth noted, "They still respect this boundary and are refraining from overflying countries in the region. So this test was entirely consistent with previous behavior: no change."
Nonetheless, it was very disconcerting for countries in the South Pacific to have a Chinese Missile drop in unannounced.
Justin Bassi, Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, wrote, "This development demonstrates an increasing willingness by Beijing to project power far beyond its own shores. China is not a Pacific nation, yet it's seeking to establish power in the region through increasingly assertive military activities. While Beijing has pursued global influence through a more gradual and surreptitious strategic approach, its engagement throughout the Pacific has been far more overt, increasingly relying on demonstrations of military capability and strategic coercion."
Dr. Dominic Meagher, an economist and public policy specialist at the Australian National University, explained the difference between how China and the USA act.
"The US pays rent to land missiles on an agreed target inside its ally's territory, outside the Rarotonga nuclear-free zone, on a schedule published years ahead. China dropped its missile into the commons, inside the Rarotonga zone, beside the exclusive economic zones of states it didn't ask, on a single day's disguised notice. These aren't the same thing, even setting aside the critical importance of intent."
Unfortunately, opacity is the hallmark of Chinese nuclear intentions. This is as the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) undertakes the fastest and most intensive build-up of nuclear weapons the world has ever seen. China has tripled its nuclear arsenal from 200 weapons to more than 600 in just six years.
Additionally, the Pentagon predicts "the PLA remains on track to have over 1,000 warheads by 2030". The USA also assesses that the PLARF currently has 400 ICBMs available for launch from 550 launchers, as well as 300 intermediate-range ballistic missiles like the DF- 26.
Zhao observed: "Beijing appears increasingly willing to display its strategic nuclear capabilities openly and more regularly. Chinese official documents have repeatedly argued that such capabilities are a stabilizing force in international relations. Having recently secured a US commitment to a 'constructive relationship of strategic stability', Beijing may conclude that these demonstrations are serving their intended purpose."
Zhao highlighted this too: "Most importantly, this test comes as China is reportedly transitioning toward an all-nuclear submarine fleet, backed by major investments in nuclear- submarine production facilities that are now coming online and are likely to draw global attention for their production capacity. Thus, the SLBM test coincides with the beginning of a new phase of rapid expansion in China's nuclear submarine force, including what's likely to be a substantial strengthening of its undersea nuclear deterrence capability."
Unfortunately, this also raises the question as to what missile the PLA will demonstrate next, since Beijing has already publicly exercised the land-based and sea-based legs of its nuclear triad.
Zhao remarked, "Following the 2024 full-range ICBM test into the Pacific, this launch raises the question of whether China will publicly test an air-launched ballistic missile next, completing the public demonstration of its nuclear triad: land-, sea- and air-based nuclear systems."
Furthermore, he said, "As China rolls out its nuclear triad, inter-service competition may become more pronounced. The rocket force drew significant attention with the 2024 ICBM test. The Navy, which operates the SSBN force, and the air force, which operates the strategic bomber fleet, may likewise want opportunities to showcase their achievements in building strategic capabilities."